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If	governments	want	to	target	the	inflation	of	CEO	pay,
they	should	also	address	pay	inequality	between
managers
A	number	of	governments	across	the	world	have	sought	to	regulate	the	pay	of	company
executives	to	help	reduce	inequality.	However,	as	Renira	C.	Angeles	and	Achim
Kemmerling	explain,	efforts	to	control	average	levels	of	executive	pay	often	overlook	the
inequality	that	exists	between	managers,	firms	and	sectors.
Since	the	1980s,	there	have	been	numerous	scandals	about	the	excessive	growth	of	pay
for	company	executives.	Enron	is	just	a	very	prominent	example	in	recent	years.	As	a	reaction,	governments	have
experimented	with	regulating	top	executive	compensation	(TEC)	in	several	ways:	the	Clinton	administration	in	the
United	States	put	a	cap	on	TEC	tax	deductibility;	while	both	the	Obama	administration	and	the	EU	imposed	a	pay
cap	for	firms	in	need	of	a	bailout	after	the	global	financial	crisis.	Some	countries	have	even	tried	to	go	further.	For
instance,	there	was	a	referendum	in	Switzerland	to	limit	CEO	pay	to	workers	by	a	ratio	of	12:1	(in	most	countries
the	actual	ratio	is	much	higher).	The	referendum	failed.
These	initiatives	have	become	salient	at	a	time	of	general	increases	in	top	income	shares	and	growing	overall
inequality.	Prominent	economists	have	argued	that	TEC	inflation	significantly	contributes	to	growing	income
inequality	by	driving	up	the	income	at	the	top.	This	can	ultimately	damage	the	legitimacy	of	democracies.
However,	governments’	attempts	to	regulate	or	even	control	executive	pay	lead	to	very	different	outcomes	across
countries.	While	in	some	countries	(e.g.	the	Nordics)	the	rise	of	TEC	has	been	relatively	moderate,	in	others	(e.g.
the	United	States	or	the	UK)	it	has	escalated.	The	academic	literature	has	targeted	these	cross-country	differences
and	has	given	reasons	why	some	governments	are	more	successful	in	halting	excessive	wage	growth	for	top
managers.	These	include	cooperation	with	strong	trade	unions,	high	tax	rates	on	corporate	and	personal	income,
and	shareholder	protection	laws	among	others.
The	importance	of	redistributive	institutions
We	argue,	however,	that	one	important	aspect	of	such	attempts	is	often	overlooked:	how	do	such	attempts	deal
with	the	heterogeneity	among	managers	and	the	income	inequality	among	CEOs?	We	do	know	that	there	are	huge
differences	between	managers	belonging,	say,	to	the	top	10,	1	and	0.1	percent	respectively.	However,	the	literature
disagrees	over	the	extent	to	which	this	inequality	is	due	to	inequalities	between	managers,	between	firms,	or	entire
sectors.	For	example,	finance	and	real	estate	are	often	mentioned	as	sectors	which	have	seen	the	highest	growth
in	TEC.	Therefore,	there	is	a	clear	case	of	heterogeneity	and	inequality	among	managers,	but	not	all	government
initiatives	reflect	this.
Consider	the	four	main	institutions	mentioned	(unions,	corporate	income	tax,	personal	income	tax	and	shareholder
protection).	Only	two	of	these	are	robust	to	the	problem	of	heterogeneity	arising	at	different	levels	(individual,	firm	or
sector).	These	institutions	are	the	only	ones	that	tackle	inequality	directly	on	the	basis	that	they	are	(potentially)
redistributive.	The	first	institution	is	cooperation	with	unions,	given,	on	average,	(centralised)	unions	tend	to	care
about	wage	inequality	within	firms	and	among	individuals.	The	second	is	personal	income	taxation,	which	occurs	at
the	individual	level	(regardless	of	which	firm	or	sector	a	manager	belongs)	and	managers	face	a	progressive	tax
rate.	Neither	corporate	taxation	(at	least	most	forms	of	it)	nor	shareholder	protection	exhibit	these	features.	They
target	the	average	manager,	no	matter	who	this	is	and	in	what	type	of	firm	or	sector	he	or	she	works.
This	leads	to	a	simple	prediction.	While	all	four	types	of	interventions	might	dampen	the	average	TEC,	only
personal	income	taxation	and	the	role	of	unions	matter	for	inequality	among	managers.	To	show	this,	we	look	at	the
effect	of	all	four	types	for	firms	of	different	sizes	in	terms	of	market	valuation.	This	follows	a	large	literature	on	the
growing	disparities	between	small	and	large	cap	firms.	If	our	argument	about	the	power	of	redistributive	institutions
is	correct,	we	should	not	only	look	at	the	direct	(aggregate)	impact	of	institutions	on	TEC,	but	also	at	the	gap
between	very	large	firms	(in	market	value)	and	the	rest.
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We	test	this	idea	with	a	new	dataset	on	TEC	for	17	countries	over	a	period	of	10	years.	The	figure	demonstrates
our	main	findings.	All	four	interventions	affect	the	average	level	of	TEC,	but	corporate	income	taxation	and
shareholder	protection	have	a	stronger	(more	visible)	effect	on	the	average	level	of	TEC	(as	seen	by	the	range	on
the	y	axis).	However,	only	personal	income	taxation	and	the	strength	of	unions	affect	small	and	large	cap	firms
differently.	In	both	cases,	the	redistributive	effect	sets	in,	i.e.	very	big	firms	see	more	of	a	depression	in	TEC.	In
other	words,	only	these	two	types	of	intervention	target	the	relative	differences	among	managers.
Figure	1:	Effect	of	union	density,	income	tax,	corporate	tax	and	shareholder	regulation	on	changes	in	top
executive	compensation
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	Socio-Economic	Review.
Inequality	is	back	on	the	political	agenda,	and	top	executive	compensation	is	an	important	driving	force	of	overall
inequality.	Governments	differ	very	much	in	their	capacity	(and	political	will)	to	address	the	issue.	We	argue	that
redistributive	institutions	still	play	a	significant,	but	somewhat	underappreciated	role	in	moderating	TEC	in	21st
century	capitalism.	The	strength	of	trade	unions	and	personal	income	tax	rates,	notably,	matter	precisely	because
they	address	the	individual	pay	heterogeneity	among	managers	(as	well	as	firms	and	sectors)	directly.	They	are
particularly	relevant	for	“large-cap”	firms.	Other	means,	such	as	corporate	income	taxation	and	or	regulation,	do	this
much	less.	If	inequality	among	managers	is	a	key	driving	force	for	a	general	rise	in	top	executive	compensation	as
previous	studies	have	argued,	initiatives	that	strengthen	such	redistributive	institutions	are	an	important	and	robust
strategy	for	governments	to	respond	to	rising	inequality.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	Socio-Economic	Review.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Kiefer	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
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